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UNDERTAKING THE TASK OF REFORMING
THE AMERICAN CHARACTER EVIDENCE
PROHIBITION: THE IMPORTANCE OF
GETTING THE EXPERIMENT OFF ON
THE RIGHT FOOT
Edward J. Imwinkelried*
"It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single ... State may ... serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social ... experiments without risk to the rest of the country."
-Justice Louis Brandeis, dissenting in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 281, 311 (1932).
The Roman poet Horace wrote that if properly begun, a task is
already half done.' The task at hand is the reform of the American
character evidence prohibition. The prohibition has long been
hornbook law in the United States.2 The initial sentence of Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b) codifies the prohibition: "Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the charac-
ter of a person in order to show in conformity therewith."'3 The
prohibition precludes a litigant from relying on a character theory
of logical relevance-the theory depicted in Figure 1.4 By way of
example, suppose that an accused is charged with a murder. The
prohibition forbids the prosecutor from introducing evidence of
the accused's other uncharged killings, on the theory that the un-
charged acts show the accused's violent character and that, in turn,
that character increases the probability that the accused committed
the charged homicide.
Although this prohibition is one of the oldest fixtures in Ameri-
can Evidence law,5 recently there have been calls for its relaxation
* Professor of Law, University of California at Davis; former Chair, Evidence
Section, American Association of Law Schools; B.A., 1967, J.D., 1969, University of
San Francisco.
1. "He has half the deed done, who has made a beginning." Epistles (tr. Christo-
pher Smart) Book I. II, TO LOLIUS, Line 40.
2. See generally 1 CHARLES MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 188-93 (4th ed. 1992).
3. FED. R. EVID. 404(b), 28 U.S.C.
4. See infra p. 304.
5. Edward J. Imwinkelried & Miguel A. Mendez, Resurrecting California's Old
Law on Character Evidence, 23 PACIFIC L.J. 1005, 1041 n. 242 (1992)(collecting cases
dating back to the mid-1800s).
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or abolition.6 These calls reflect, inter alia, two developments.
First, there is a growing realization in the United States that other
common-law jurisdictions have already abandoned a rigid charac-
ter prohibition.7 The leading precedent is the House of Lords'
1975 decision in R. v. Boardman.' In Boardman, the Lords
stressed that the admissibility of evidence of an accused's un-
charged misconduct should turn on its cogency rather than its cate-
gory;9 if evidence has great probative value on a character theory
of logical relevance, the evidence should not be reflexively ex-
cluded "by categorization.' 10 Boardman purported to relax the
prohibition across the board in all types of cases. Under this view,
whatever the charged offense against the accused, the degree of
probative value should be dispositive of the question of the admis-
sibility of uncharged misconduct."
Second, although at one time it was assumed that a person's
character traits are weak predictors of the person's conduct,'12 that
assumption is being reassessed.' 3 At the time the Federal Rules of
Evidence were being drafted, the dominant personality theory was
situationism.14 Situationists believed that environmental factors
largely determine a person's conduct. 5 In contrast, the person's
supposed character traits or disposition had little predictive
value.' 6 However, a new theory-interactionism-has emerged.' 7
According to that theory, when there is a sufficiently large. sample
6. Office of Legal Policy, Report to the Attorney General on the Admission of
Criminal Histories at Trial, 22 J. LAW REFORM 707 (1989).
7. P. B. Carter, Forbidden Reasoning Permissible: Similar Fact Evidence a Dec-
ade After Boardman, 48 MODERN L.REV. 29 (1985); Rupert Cross, Fourth Time
Lucky-Similar Fact Evidence in the House of Lords, CRIM. L. REV. 62 (1975); L. H.
Hoffman, Similar Facts Evidence After Boardman, 91 LAW QUARTERLY REV. 193
(1975).
8. [1975] A.C. 421.
9. P.B. CARTER, CASES AND STATUTES ON EVIDENCE 536 (1981).
10. R. v. Boardman [1975] A.C. 421, 452 (Lord Hailsham).
11. Id. at 457 (Lord Cross).
12. Miguel A. Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence
Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1003 (1984).
13. David P. Bryden and Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense
Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 561-65 (1994).
14. Susan M. Davis, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of
Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 514-15 (1991).
15. Id. at 515.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 518.
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of the person's conduct in similar situations, on the average, the
person's behavior in analogous settings can be forecast.' 8
These two developments have fueled the drive to revise the
American character evidence doctrine. To be sure, no American
jurisdiction has gone as far as the United Kingdom; neither Con-
gress nor any state has overturned the character evidence prohibi-
tion in all types of cases. Several jurisdictions, however, have
already begun to experiment with partial repeals of the prohibi-
tion. At the state level in 1994, the Missouri legislature adopted a
statute providing that in certain prosecutions of adults for offenses
against victims under 14 years of age, "evidence that the defendant
has committed other.., uncharged crimes involving victims under
fourteen years of age shall be admissible for the purpose of show-
ing the propensity of the defendant to commit the crime . . . with
which he is charged ...."19 The Indiana legislature has also ap-
proved a statute permitting the admission of uncharged acts of
child molestation on a character theory of logical relevance.20 At
the federal level in late 1994, Congress gave tentative approval2' to
three new Federal Rule of Evidence provisions, Rules 413-15, abol-
ishing the character evidence prohibition in certain types of crimi-
nal and civil cases. Rule 413(a) reads:
In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an of-
fense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's commission
of another offense or offenses is admissible, and may be consid-
ered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
Rule 414(a) contains a parallel provision for child molestation
prosecutions, and for its part, Rule 415(a) would sweep away the
prohibition "[i]n a civil case in which a claim for damages or other
relief is predicated on a party's alleged commission of conduct con-
stituting an offense of sexual assault or child molestation." In
short, the task of "reforming" the American character evidence
prohibition is under way.
18. Id. at 517-20.
19. Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.025 (effective January 1, 1995).
20. IND. STAT. ANN. § 35-37-4-15 (1994).
21. The legislation provides that although Congress has voted to approve the Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence amendments in question, the United States Judicial Conference
will have 150 days to comment on the amendments. If the conference recommends
that the amendments as worded by Congress go into effect, they take effect 30 days
after the transmittal of the conference's recommendation. If the conference recom-
mends otherwise, the amendments nevertheless take effect within 150 days after the
transmittal of the conference's recommendation unless Congress revisits the issue and
rejects or revises the amendments.
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If Horace was right, however, the question is whether the task
has begun properly. Have Congress and the Indiana and Missouri
legislatures chosen the right starting point for revising the prohibi-
tion? In the short term, if they have selected the wrong starting
point, we may see extensive litigation attacking the legislation. As
Section III of this Essay explains, the starting points codified in the
federal and Missouri legislation will enable accused disadvantaged
by the legislation to raise a serious equal protection challenge-a
claim that they are being treated differently than other accused
simply because of the charge filed against them. In the long term,
the chosen starting point could result in miscarriages of justice. As
Justice Cardozo once remarked, the indiscriminate admission of an
accused's past misdeeds can pose a "peril to the innocent."22 The
contemporary abhorrence of sexual misconduct and offenses
against children is as intense as it is widespread. Repulsed by evi-
dence of such uncharged crimes by an accused, a juror might be
tempted to look past weaknesses in the prosecution's proof of the
accused's guilt of the charged crime. If it becomes evident that the
legislation leads to that consequence in a signficant number of
cases, the experiment with the revision of the character prohibition
may end in failure.
The thesis of this brief Essay is that Congress and the Missouri
legislature have chosen the wrong starting point for this experi-
ment. The relevant policy questions are how probative the un-
charged offense is of a person's charged conduct and how great is
the risk of unfair prejudice,23 namely, that the testimony of the un-
charged offense will incline the jury to overlook gaps in the show-
ing of guilt of the charged offense. Unfortunately, as the starting
points, Congress and the Missouri legislature have chosen offenses
which possess little probative value but acute potential for
prejudice.
Even if the three tentatively approved Federal Rules provisions
ultimately go into effect in federal practice, the questions raised in
this Essay are of far more than academic interest. There are 48
other states to be heard from. While the federal legislation might
have great symbolic value, the vast majority of sexual assault and
child molestation prosecutions occur in state court. Those 48 juris-
dictions have yet to decide whether and, if so, how to begin their
process of reforming the character evidence prohibition. This Es-
22. People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930).
23. See Advisory Committee Note, FED. R. EVID. 403 (explaining the technical
concept of "prejudice" within the meaning of that term in Rule 403).
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say urges those jurisdictions not to follow Congress's lead; rather,
this Essay urges those states to begin their experiments by follow-
ing the lead of the empirical research discussed below in Section III
and choosing as their starting points offenses with demonstrably
higher probative value and less capacity to prejudice an accused
unfairly.
The first section of this Essay describes the status quo codified in
Federal Rule 404(b). This section identifies the twin rationales for
the prohibition set out in 404(b). The next section turns to the ar-
guments comprising the case for reforming the prohibition. This
section evaluates the arguments in terms of the rationales for the
prohibition. The third and final section advances the thesis that the
starting points chosen by Congress and the Indiana and Missouri
legislatures are unsound. This section explains that there are pref-
erable starting points which legislatures and courts in the other 48
states should seriously consider if they are inclined to make inroads
on the character evidence prohibition.
The Status Quo: The First Sentence of Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b)
Outside the courtroom, laypersons routinely rely on character
reasoning.24 "It is perfectly logical to take past performance into
account in making all kinds of important personal decisions. '25
The character evidence prohibition cannot be defended on the
ground that evidence of an accused's other crimes is logically irrel-
evant to the question of whether the accused committed the
charged offense; the logical relevance of uncharged misconduct on
that question is undeniable. However, both at common law and
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence that is technically
logically relevant may be excluded when realistically, the evidence
poses probative dangers that outweigh its probative worth.
The Risk of Misdecision.
One probative danger is misdecision or prejudice. Codifying the
common law, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 authorizes a trial judge
to bar relevant, otherwise admissible evidence when the admission
24. See generally Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Charac-
ter of Specific Acts Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 777 (1981); H. Richard Uviller, Evi-
dence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 845 (1982).
25. James McElhaney, Character and Conduct, 17 LrrIGATION 45, 46 (Winter
1991).
19951
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXII
of the evidence would give rise to a substantial danger of "unfair
prejudice."26 The accompanying Advisory Committee Note states
that the judge may exclude marginally relevant evidence which
"suggest[s] decision on an improper basis."27 By way of example,
this danger accounts for the general rule, set out in Federal Rule of
Evidence 411, precluding the admission of testimony about a civil
defendant's liability insurance. 28 The Advisory Committee Note to
Rule 411 states that the policy justification for the exclusionary rule
is a "feeling that knowledge of the presence ... of liability insur-
ance would induce juries to decide cases on improper grounds. 29
The Risk of Overvaluation.
Another recognized danger is the risk that lay jurors will over-
value the testimony.30 This danger helps explain the existence of
many of the special restrictions on the introduction of scientific evi-
dence. The courts prescribing the restrictions often assert that
many jurors give inordinate weight to scientific testimony.3' These
courts fear that even flawed scientific evidence will "assume a pos-
ture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury."'32
A character theory of logical relevance presents both of these
classic probative dangers. As Figure 133 indicates, a character the-
ory of logical relevance entails two inferences. If prosecutors were
permitted to rely on the theory as a basis for introducing evidence
of an accused's uncharged crimes, the initial question facing the
jury would be to decide whether the accused possesses a certain
bad character trait. The jury would consciously have to address the
question of what kind or type of person the accused is. At a sub-
conscious level, the jurors might be tempted to punish the accused
for his or her past misdeeds34 -especially when the testimony indi-
26. FED. R. EvID. 403.
27. Id. at Adv. Comm. Note, FED. R. EVID. 403.
28. Id. at FED. R. EVID. 411.
29. Id. at Adv. Comm. Note, FED. R. EvID. 411.
30. Victor Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18
U.C.DAvis L.REv. 59, 83 (1984); Richard Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L.
REV. 1021, 1030-31 (1977).
31. People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).
32. Id.
33. See infra p. 304.
34. Recent Case, Criminal Law-Admissibility of Evidence of Other Crimes, 24
TEMP. L.Q. 245, 246 (1950).
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cates that to date, the accused has escaped unpunished for those
misdeeds.35 Former Justice William Brennan once remarked,
One of the dangers inherent in the admission of extrinsic offense
evidence is that the jury may convict the defendant not for the
offense charged but for the extrinsic offense. This danger is par-
ticularly great where.., the extrinsic activity was not the subject
of a conviction; the jury may feel that the defendant should be
punished for that activity even if he is not guilty of the offense
charged.36
In the United States, a misdecision on this basis is of special con-
cern, for it would amount to a violation of the accused's constitu-
tional rights.37 In 1962, in Robinson v. California,38 the Supreme
Court announced that the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and
unusual punishment forbids a state from criminalizing a person's
status. Of course, once the jury has found the accused guilty of a
discrete, criminal act, the accused's recidivism may be considered
during sentencing. 39 However, unlike a totalitarian country, the
United States does not countenance "trial by dossier;"'  the gov-
ernment may not charge an accused with being an enemy of the
State and place the accused's entire life on trial. "In our system of
jurisprudence, we try cases, rather than persons."41 Requiring the
jurors to focus on the type of person the accused is poses a danger
that some jurors will vote to convict because of their negative per-
ception of the accused as a dangerous, anti-social person.
That probative danger is compounded by the further risk
presented by the second inferential step in a character theory of
logical relevance. Under this theory, after the jury decides what
inference to draw as to the type of person the accused is, the jury
must employ that inference in a particular manner; they must util-
35. Calvin Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing and the Admissibility of Other Crimes Evi-
dence: A Sliding Scale of Proof, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 556, 561 (1984); C.R.
Williams, The Problem of Similar Fact Evidence, 5 DALHOUSIE L.J. 281, 289 (1979);
Comment, Of Propensity, Prejudice, and Plain Meaning: The Accused's Use of Excul-
patory Specific Acts Evidence and the Need to Amend Rule 404(b), 87 Nw. U. L. REV.
651, 669 (1993); United States v. Erickson, 797 F. Supp. 1387, 1391 (N.D.Ill. 1992);
Brown v. Commonwealth, 763 S.W.2d 128 (Ky. 1989).
36. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 361-62 (1990)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. See generally D. Craig Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Constitutional Challenge
to the Treatment of Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Trials, 64 WASH. L. REV.
289 (1989).
38. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
39. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
40. Bernyk v. State, 355 S.E.2d 753 (Ga. App. 1987).
41. People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 503-04 (Mich. 1988).
19951
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXII
ize the inference as the basis for a further inference as to conduct
on the charged occasion. In other words, they must use the infer-
ence as a predictor of conduct and inquire whether they believe
that on the charged occasion, the accused acted "in character"-
that is, consistently with his or her bad character trait. While the
first inferential step creates the risk of misdecision and unfair prej-
udice, this step triggers a risk of overvaluation.
The fear is that jurors might overestimate the probative worth of
the accused's bad character, demonstrated by uncharged crimes, in
resolving the question of whether the accused perpetrated the
charged offense. There is general agreement among psychologists
that when laypersons learn of an individual's acts, they tend to
form a "unified, integrated" impression42 of the individual's per-
sonality.43 There is, however, sharp disagreement over the ques-
tion of whether it is warranted to give such impressions significant
weight in predicting the individual's conduct in a specific situa-
tion.44 If the initial inference as to the accused's character "overly
influence[s]" the jury, they "will, therefore, less likely reach an ac-
curate verdict." 45
Rule 404(b) currently imposes an absolute prohibition46 on the
use of a character theory of logical relevance as a predicate for
introducing evidence of specific, uncharged acts. Although such
acts possess logical relevance on that theory, the prohibition exists
to shield the accused from the two probative dangers discussed
above. Those dangers furnish the raison d'etre for the status quo
prohibition of character reasoning; and as we shall now see, they
also supply a convenient framework for reviewing the arguments
for overturning the prohibition.
42. Robert G. Lawson, Credibility and Character: A Different Look at an Intermi-
nable Problem, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 758, 767, 776-77 (1975).
43. Roderick Munday, Stepping Beyond the Bounds of Credibility: The Applica-
tion of Section I (f)(ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, CRIM. L. REV. 511,513-14
(1986).
44. Miguel A. Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence
Code § 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1003(1984). See also Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 707 (7th Cir. 1987); David Crump,
How Should We Treat Character Offered to Prove Conduct, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 279,
283 (1987); David Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and
Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1986-87).
45. Randolph N. Jonakait, Biased Evidence Rules: A Framework for Judicial
Analysis and Reform, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 67, 68.
46. United States v. Hahn, 17 F.3d 502, 509 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Arias-
Montoya, 967 F.2d 708, 709 (1st Cir. 1992); People v. Honey, 596 P.2d 751 (Colo.
1979).
UNDERTAKING THE TASK
The General Case For Reforming The Status Quo
The United States Justice Department has attempted to con-
struct a case for jettisoning the character evidence prohibition. To
do so, the Department has presented several arguments;47 some of
the Department's primary arguments relate directly to the policy
rationales for the prohibition codified in Rule 404(b).
The Risk of Misdecision.
As previously stated, one rationale is the fear that if character
reasoning were legitimated, lay jurors might succumb to the temp-
tation to convict the accused on the basis of his or her criminal
past-even when there is a reasonable doubt about the accused's
guilt of the charged crime. However, as the Department's Office
of Legal Policy has noted, the United States is not the only country
which forbids punishing the accused on the basis of their status.48
Many other democratic countries such as the United Kingdom do
so. Yet, most of these countries have nevertheless abandoned a
rigid prohibition of character evidence. Those countries evidently
do not believe that the potential misuse of the evidence necessi-
tates a categorical ban on the admission of character evidence.
An advocate of the status quo might argue that the risk of mis-
use should be of greater concern in the United States because we
rely on lay jurors rather than professional jurists as decision-mak-
ers. "More than ninety percent of the world's criminal jury trials,
and nearly all of its civil jury trials, take place in the United
States."49 However, there are not only criminal jury trials in other
countries such as the United Kingdom; 50 there are also many civil-
law democratic countries where laity still participate as decision-
makers to an extent.5
Moreover, an opponent of the status quo can plausibly contend
that American society is now more willing to run the risk in ques-
47. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Small Contribution to the Debate Over the Pro-
posed Legislation Abolishing the Character Evidence Prohibition in Sex Offense Prose-
cutions, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1125 (1993).
48. Office of Legal Policy, Report to the Attorney General on the Admission of
Criminal Histories at Trial, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 707, 750-752 (1989).
49. Gerhard Casper & Hans Zeisel, Lay judges in the German civil courts, in J. H.
MERRYMAN, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEMS 720-25 (1978).
50. Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Comparative Law Analysis of the Standard for Ad-
mitting Scientific Evidence: The United States Stands Alone, 42 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L
15, 20 (1989).
51. Id. at 18.
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tion. Poll after poll documents the belief that curbing crime is the
most pressing problem facing the United States. A September
1994 Roper poll found that 62% of the over 1,000 respondents per-
sonally knew a crime victim.5 2 In a Yankelovich Partners poll re-
leased October 19, 1994, 86% of the 800 adults responding
answered that the crime problem has "become worse in the past
few years. 5 3 In a similar September 1994 poll conducted by the
Wirthlin Group, 61% of the respondents stated that crime is a "se-
rious problem" in the United States. 4 The abolition of the charac-
ter evidence prohibition would give recividists pause; they would
know that if tried, they would be more likely to be convicted be-
cause of the freer admissibility of their prior misconduct. If the
prevention of crime is viewed as a societal priority and other demo-
cratic countries are apparently willing to run the risk of misuse of
bad character evidence to pursue that priority, it is certainly not
unthinkable for the United States to do likewise.
The Risk of Overvaluation.
The other rationale supporting the status quo is the belief that
the typical lay jurors will attach too much weight to the accused's
bad character in assessing the probability that the accused commit-
ted the charged offense. However, there is no a priori answer to
the question of the extent of lay jurors' ability to evaluate critically
character as a predictor of conduct. That question lends itself to
empirical investigation, but unfortunately the state of the empirical
research is in flux. 55
At one time, situationism was the most popular theory among
psychologists.5 6 Situationists denied that persons possess perma-
nent character traits which are highly predictive of conduct. They
found little empirical support for any hypothesis of cross-situa-
tional consistency,5 8 and they consequently concluded that situa-
tion-specific, environmental factors were far more influential.5 9
52. Copy on file with the author.
53. Id.
54. Id. See also Gail Diane Cox, Voters Tough on Criminals: Law and Order Ini-
tiatives Sweep the Polls, While Tort Reform and Others Lose, NAT'L. L.J., Nov. 21,
1994, at A6.
55. Bryden and Park, supra note 13, at 559-64.
56. Susan M. Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of
Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 515 (1991).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 514.
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More recent commentators, however, assert that the support for
situationism is no longer "monolithic."'  More recent empirical
studies indicate that recidivism rates might be higher than previ-
ously supposed.61 These studies lend support to the emergent in-
teractionist theory that a person's conduct is a product of his or her
character traits as well as situation-specific external stimuli.62 In-
teractionists believe that at least when there is an adequate sample
of the person's conduct in highly analogous situations, it is possible
to draw reliable character inferences and legitimate to employ
those inferences as a basis for predictions of behavior.63 Hence,
just as the proponents of the character evidence prohibition may
be guilty of overstating the risk of misdecision, they may have un-
derstated the probative value of character proffered as circumstan-
tial evidence of conduct. If both of the rationales for the
prohibition are suspect, it is arguably time to consider reforming
the character evidence doctrine.
The Specific Starting Points For Reform Chosen By Congress
and The Missouri Legislature
As the preceding section pointed out, many democratic countries
admit character evidence in all types of criminal cases. In contrast,
no American jurisdiction has decided to go that far and attempt a
wholesale repeal of the character prohibition. Even the most dar-
ing jurisdictions, Congress and the Indiana and Missouri legisla-
tures, have been content to experiment with selective repeal in
prosecutions for specified types of offenses. The problem is that in
terms of the fundamental policy concerns of misdecision and over-
valuation, the specified prosecutions are the cases in which the
character evidence prohibition is most defensible. The available
empirical studies, including some conducted by the Justice Depart-
ment itself, indicate that those crimes carry great potential for un-
fair prejudice and have little probative value.
60. David Crump, How Should We Treat Character Evidence Offered to Prove
Conduct?, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 279, 283 (1987).
61. Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Miscon-
duct in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 149 (1993).
62. Davis, supra note 56, at 517-20.
63. Id.
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The Risk of Misdecision.
The risk of misdecision is greatest when the jury is likely to find
the character of the accused's uncharged misconduct repugnant6
or revolting.65 The admission of testimony about that type of mis-
conduct can poison the jurors' minds66 and generate an overmas-
tering hostility against the accused.67
Evidence of sexual misconduct or child molestation by an ac-
cused has an extraordinary tendency to create such hostility. Cer-
tain categories of sex offenders, notably those who prey on young
children, are considered veritable monsters. One federal court
stated that the possibility of hostility is "somewhat heightened" in
such cases.68 For its part, the Washington Supreme Court has ob-
served that "the potential for prejudice is at its highest" "in sex
cases."
69
The available empirical studies confirm that observation. The
most famous study of the behavioral patterns of American jurors is
the Chicago Jury Project, described in the classic text, THE AMERI-
CAN JURY by Kalven and Zeisel.7 ° One of the questions that the
Chicago researchers investigated was the jurors' reaction to various
types of offenses. The researchers specifically commented on the
potential for prejudice in sex offense prosecutions. According to
the researchers, many jurors found such conduct "reprehensible"'71
and became "outraged. ' 72 Jurors were especially likely to find the
conduct offensive when the victim was a young child.73 The re-
searchers described the danger that jurors will have "no patience
with... [legal] technicality" and will "override[ ] distinctions of the
law" to find the accused guilty. 74
64. William Roth, Understanding Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts: A Diagram-
matic Approach, 9 PEPP. L. REV. 297, 300 n.9 (1982).
65. ZELMAN COWEN & P.B. CARTER, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 146
(1956).
66. HARRY CLAY UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 182 (4th ed. 1935).
67. 2 JACK WEINSTEIN & MARGARET BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE,
§ 404[18] (1994).
68. United States v. Buhl, 712 F. Supp. 53, 57 (E.D.Pa. 1989), aff'd without op.,
899 F.2d 1219 (3d Cir. 1990).
69. State v. Coe, 684 P.2d 668, 673 (Wash. 1984).
70. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
71. Id. at 397.
72. Id. at 396.
73. Id. at 396-97.
74. Id. at 396.
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Subsequent studies corroborate these early findings. In a 1986
poll, 1,000 adults were surveyed.75 The adults were asked to rank
various crimes according to their heinousness. While murder was
the crime rated most serious, rape, incest and child abuse were the
next three highest rated crimes.
A 1989 study conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the
Department of Justice's research arm, points to the same conclu-
sion.76 This survey canvassed 60,000 adults.77 The researchers at-
tempted to determine how the public perceives the relative
seriousness of a wide range of crimes. As in the 1986 poll, homi-
cide received the highest rating. However, the next two highest
ratings went to the offenses of rape and child abuse. Non-violent
theft offenses consistently received much lower ratings.
In short, as their starting points for revising the character evi-
dence prohibition, Congress and the Indiana and Missouri legisla-
tures have chosen offenses which are most likely to trigger the risk
of misdecision-one of the probative dangers that inspires prohibi-
tion. It may be true that as a general proposition, American Evi-
dence law has exaggerated the danger of misdecision that would be
created by the admission of proof of the accused's bad character.
However, that danger is anything but fanciful in the case of the
offenses specified in the statutes approved by Congress and the
Missouri legislature.
The Risk of Overvaluation.
To make matters worse, the chosen starting points can also be
faulted on the ground that the specified offenses do not appear to
be particularly probative as predictors of conduct. Citing an article
by a former chair of the Federal Parole Board, one commentator
characterized the supposed high rate of recidivism among sex of-
fenders as a downright myth.78 In 1993, Dean Thomas Reed pub-
lished a comprehensive review of the empirical studies of
recidivism rates.79 In the main, those studies report that the
recidivisim rate for sexual offenses is lower than the rate for other
75. Sin, PEOPLE, Feb. 10, 1986, at 106, 108.
76. The Severity of Crime, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN (Jan. 1984).
77. How Do Americans Rank the Severity of Crime?, INSIDE DRUG LAW, Sept.
1984, at 9.
78. James M. H. Gregg, Other Acts of Sexual Misbehavior and Perversion as Evi-
dence in Prosecutions for Sexual Offenses, 6 ARIz. L. REV. 212, 223 (1965).
79. Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Miscon-
duct in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AMER. J. CRIM. L. 127 (1993).
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serious crime.80 Similarly, the recidivism rate for pedophilia ap-
pears to be below the national average for all crimes.81 Among sex
offenses, the crime with the highest recidivism rate is exhibition-
ism. 82 In Dean Reed's words, the recidivism studies reveal "noth-
ing particularly unique about sex offenses" which would justify
singling them out for "a special rule" admitting "uncharged crimi-
nal conduct more leniently than in drug sales or possession of sto-
len property prosecutions."
As in the case of the risk of misdecision, the Justice Depart-
ment's own empirical studies are corroborative. In a 1989 study,
the Bureau of Justice Statistics tracked 100,000 prisoners for three
years to determine the extent of their recidivism.8 3 The researchers
used rearrest rates as a measure of recividism. The rate for rapists
was 7.7%. "Of the offenses studied, only homicide had a lower
recidivism rate . . . ." The rate for the theft offense of burglary
was 31.9%-more than four times higher.85 It may be true that in
the past, we have underestimated the probative value of an ac-
cused's character as circumstantial proof of the accused's conduct
on the charged occasion and, conversely, overestimated the risk of
jury overvaluation. Like the risk of misdecision, however, that risk
appears acute in the case of the crimes specified in the statutes
passed by Congress and the Missouri legislature. Those crimes
seemingly have very little probative worth as circumstantial proof
of contrast. In sharp contrast, the recidivism rates for other types
of crimes such as theft offenses are demonstrably-and mark-
edly-higher.
Other Potential Rationales for Singling Out Sex Offenses and
Child Molestation as the Initial Inroads on the
Character Evidence Prohibition.
Of course, the arguments critiqued above do not exhaust the
case for the choices made by Congress and the Indiana and Mis-
souri legislatures. For example, it might be urged that sexual as-
sault and child molestation deserve special treatment, since they
are such grave crimes. No one in their right mind would dispute
that both offenses are serious crimes. It is doubtful, however, that
80. Id. at 149-50.
81. Id. at 151.
82. Id. at 154.
83. Bryden and Park, supra note 13 at 572.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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standing alone, that argument can sustain a special character evi-
dence rule for prosecutions of those crimes. The crime of murder
is arguably at least as serious. As previously stated, murder re-
ceived the highest rating in the 1986 and the 1989 studies. Further-
more, murder typically carries more serious sentences, notably the
death penalty. Yet neither Rule 413 nor Rule 414 has any applica-
tion to murder prosecutions.
Alternatively, it might be contended that there is a greater need
for the evidence in these types of cases. Prosecutions for these
kinds of crimes often degenerate into "swearing contests," and the
admission of evidence of an accused's similar misdeeds on a char-
acter theory might help tip the balance in favor of a guilty verdict.
Although there is a large element of truth in the assertion that the
verdict in trials for these crimes often turns on the jury's assess-
ment of the relative credibility of the complainant and the ac-
cused, 6 a court would be hard pressed to treat that contention as
an adequate justification for differential treatment of sexual assault
and child molestation. There is a greater need for evidence to tip
in the balance in prosecutions for many other types of crimes.
To begin with, at least in prosecutions for sexual misconduct or
child molestation, there is usually a victim capable of testifying at
trial. In contrast, many theft offenses are committed clandestinely
in the absence of the victimized property owner; there is no eye-
witness victim capable of coming forward to identify the accused as
the perpetrator. Moreover, in many jurisdictions, there are special
evidentiary doctrines which can be used to enhance the credibility
of the victim of a sexual assault or child molestation. Even before
any attempted impeachment, the prosecutor in such a case may
prove a fresh complaint to bolster the alleged victim's credibility. 7
After impeachment, the prosecutor can introduce expert testimony
as to rape trauma syndrome 88 or child sexual abuse accommoda-
tion syndrome8 9 to rehabilitate the victim's credibility. Moreover,
given the nature of sexual assault and child molestation, it is far
more likely that the perpetrator will leave trace evidence such as
86. Richard A. Hibey, The Trial of a Rape Case: An Advocate's Analysis of Cor-
roboration, Consent, and Character, 11 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 309 (1973); Judith Row-
land, Rape Experts Dispell Jurors' Preconceptions, THE PROSECUTOR'S BRIEF 21
(Sept.-Oct. 1979).
87. EDWARD IMWINKELRIED, PAUL GIANNELLI, FRANCIS GILLIGAN & FREDERIC
LEDERER, COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 702 (2d ed. 1993).
88. 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
§ 9-4 (2d ed. 1993).
89. Id. at § 9-5.
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blood, semen or saliva at the crime scene-material which lends
itself to the analysis of genetic markers such as DNA.' Thus, quite
apart from character evidence, the prosecutor in these cases will
often have a wide array of evidentiary tools to use to persuade the
trier of fact-a wider array than the prosecutor has in prosecutions
for many other types of crimes.
Conclusion
When a researcher begins an experiment, he or she typically
starts with an experimental design which has a decent prospect for
success and which creates little danger to human safety. The re-
searcher is interested in determining whether the hypothesis war-
rants intensive empirical investigation; the researcher wants to find
out whether the hypothesis holds true under even relaxed test con-
ditions. If the hypothesis fails that lax test, it has been falsified,91
and the hypothesis obviously does not warrant the time and ex-
pense entailed in further testing. However, if the hypothesis passes
that test, it can be provisionally accepted.92 The researcher then
conducts experiments under more severe test conditions.93 Subse-
quently, more stringent tests "push[ ] a hypothesis to its limits
rather than [merely] reexamining the paradigmatic case around
which it was formulated."'94 The later experiments provide incre-
mental verification 95 for the hypothesis and enable the researcher
to refine the hypothesis.
Furthermore, the researcher usually designs the early experi-
ments to minimize the safety risks. If the researcher is testing an
hypothesis about the release of energy from a certain chemical re-
action, the initial experiment might be conducted in an under-
ground chamber to reduce the danger of releasing uncontrolled
contaminants into the atmosphere. Likewise, when the researcher
is investigating an unproven medication, the researcher often be-
gins with animal tests. The researcher conducts tests involving
human subjects only if the hypothesis survives the earlier animal
experiments. Since the later tests might create a significant health
90. Id. at Ch. 17; 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE Ch. 18 (2d ed. 1993).
91. Bert Black, Francisco J. Ayala and Carol Saffran-Brinks, Science and the Law
in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REv, 715,
762-63 (1994).
92. Id. at 762.
93. Id. at 762-63, 783-84.
94. Id. at 763.
95. Id. at 762.
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risk, it would be socially irresponsible for the researcher to forego
the earlier, less hazardous variations of the experiment.
Although scientists appreciate the logic of designing experiments
in this fashion, that logic has been lost on Congress and the Indiana
and Missouri legislatures. As we have seen, as the starting points
for the experiment with the reform of the character evidence pro-
hibition, they have chosen crimes with minimal probative value as
predictors of the accused's conduct. It would make far more sense
to initiate the experiment by selecting crimes with higher recidi-
vism rates. Again, in the 1989 Bureau of Justice Statistics study,
the researchers found that the rearrest rate for burglary was more
than four times higher than the rearrest rate for sexual offenses. 6
The choices by Congress and the Indiana and Missouri legisla-
tures seem even more debatable if we turn to the risk factor. A
scientific researcher customarily defers the most hazardous experi-
mental designs to the very end of the series of tests. Congress and
the Missouri legislature have done just the opposite. Here, the risk
is that the jurors will find the evidence of the accused's uncharged
misconduct so inflammatory97 that they will be blinded to the
weakness of the proof of the guilt of the charged crime. As Justice
Cardozo cautioned, 98 the introduction of sordid,99 uncharged mis-
conduct evidence can result in the conviction of accused who in
fact are innocent of the charged offense. The 1984 Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics study'00 demonstrates that the average citizen regards
sexual misconduct and child molestation with special disdain. The
available research indicates that the admission of testimony about
an accused's uncharged theft offenses would be much less likely to
trigger a wrongful conviction.
An intelligently designed experiment for the reform of the
American evidence doctrine ought to begin with much different
starting points than those chosen by Congress and the Indiana and
Missouri legislatures. Theft offenses would be an exceptionally
good candidate for the initial inroad on the character evidence pro-
hibition; the recidivism rate for theft offenses is quite high, the av-
erage juror is likely to find evidence of uncharged theft offenses
much less repulsive than evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct,
96. Bryden and Park, supra note 13 at 572.
97. People v. Cardenas, 647 P.2d 569, 576 (Cal. 1982).
98. People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.E. 192, 200 (N.Y. 1930).
99. Michael Patrick May, Evidence of Other Crimes as Substantive Proof of Guilt
in Maryland, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 245, 254 (1980).
100. The Severity of Crime, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN (Jan. 1984).
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and prosecutors have fewer evidentiary tools at their disposal in
theft offense trials.
The starting points specified in the federal, Indiana and Missouri
legislation not only raise the spectre of the conviction of the inno-
cent; they also virtually guarantee years of litigation of equal pro-
tection challenges to the legislation. Although the legislation
certainly classifies accused on the basis of the nature of the offense
they are charged with, in the long run the legislation may survive
the challenges. The courts ultimately may decide that the appro-
priate tier of equal protection scrutiny is the minimal, 1 1 rational
basis10 2 test. Under this test, the issue is whether the legislative
classification bears a rational relation to a legitimate state policy;
and the courts will sustain the classification so long as the legisla-
ture could conceive 0 3 or hypothesize" ° a set of facts establishing a
nexus between the policy and the classification. If the courts in-
voke the minimal scrutiny test, the legislation is likely to be upheld.
For example, rape is one of the most underreported crimes against
the person.10 5 Rape victims are understandably reluctant to come
forward and air such horrific experiences in a public courtroom.
The legislatures could conceive that the enactment of statutes such
as Federal Rules 413-14 would give rape victims further incentive
to report the offense. The victim might engage in a type of cost/
benefit analysis in deciding whether to come forward. When there
is little likelihood that the victim's testimony will result in a convic-
tion, the victim could conclude that that small likelihood does not
justify the personal costs to him or her. However, if the victim per-
ceived that statutes such as Rules 413-14 increased that likelihood,
they might be more willing to report the offense; and their willing-
ness to do so would strengthen the enforcement of the laws
criminalizing sexual misconduct.1' 6
101. Crane v. Schneider, 635 F. Supp. 1430, 1432 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
102. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
103. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
104. Bunyan v. Camacho, 770 F.2d 773, 774 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S.
903 (1986).
105. Lisa van Amburg & Suzanne Rechtin, Rape Evidence Reform in Missouri: A
Remedy for the Adverse Impact of Evidentiary Rules on Rape Victims, 22 ST. Louis
L.J. 367 (1978); Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the
Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1977); Elizabeth M. Davis, Rape Shield Statutes:
Legislative Responses to Probative Dangers, 27 J. URBAN & CONTEMP. L. 271 (1984).
106. But see Joel Schrag & Suzanne Scotchmer, Crime and Prejudice: The Use of
Character Evidence in Criminal Trials, 10 J.L. & ECON. ORG. 319 (1994) (arguing that
in some cases, the abolition of the character evidence prohibition will encourage
rather than deter their perpetration).
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The real battle in the equal protection litigation challenging this
legislation will be over the appropriate tier of equal protection
scrutiny. The defense bar will argue that the statutes in question
do not codify "run-of-the-mill" evidentiary rules, subject to mini-
mal scrutiny. The defense bar has a plausible contention that the
classifications embodied in these statutes must be subjected to the
intermediate level of scrutiny.107 Under this test, to pass muster,
the classification must be substantially related to an important state
interest.10 8 The courts have sometimes invoked middle level scru-
tiny when the classification in question affected socially important,
albeit nonconstitutional, interests. 1°9 Again, the Supreme Court
has declared that it offends the Eighth Amendment to criminalize
status.110 Although the abolition of the character evidence prohibi-
tion does not directly criminalize an accused's status, the routine
admission of bad character evidence heightens the risk that the
jury will convict on account the accused's status as a recidivist
rather than the strength of the evidence of the charged crime. If
the courts opt to apply the intermediate tier of equal protection
scrutiny, the doubts about the aptness of the starting points chosen
by Congress and the Indiana and Missouri legislatures could prove
fatal to the legislation. Given the minimal probative value of the
specified offenses as predictors of conduct and their repulsive na-
ture, a court might find it difficult to conclude that the classification
satisfies middle tier scrutiny.
In sum, although the nascent experiment with the American
character evidence doctrine may succeed, it certainly will not do so
because of the starting points chosen by Congress and the Missouri
legislature. Quite to the contrary, the experiment might succeed
despite the inaptness of the chosen starting points. Importantly,
though, while Congress and Missouri proceed to implement their
questionable legislation, the remaining states can undertake their
own different, sounder experiments. They could formulate their
own rules selectively repealing the character prohibition in prose-
107. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
108. Equality Foundation of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417 (S.D. Ohio
1994); Ridgeway v. Montana High School Ass'n, 633 F. Supp. 1564, 1579 (D.Mont.
1986), aff'd, 858 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1988); Baker v. Vanderbilt University, 616 F. Supp.
330, 331 (M.D.Tenn. 1985).
109. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-33 (2d ed.
1988).
110. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962); See also Provident Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 864 F. Supp. 1274, 1291 (N.D. Ga. 1994) ("The fundamen-
tal rights... identified by the.. .Supreme Court" as triggering "strict judicial scrutiny"
include "the right to fairness in the criminal process.").
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cutions for other offenses-offenses with appreciably higher recidi-
vism rates and less potential for unfair prejudice. In his dissenting
opinion in New State Ice Co.,111 Justice Brandeis lauded the poten-
tial for experimentation inherent in the federal system. That po-
tential may prove to be the salvation of the new experiment with
evidence of an accused's bad character.
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